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RECENT CASES
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 51 these affidavits would be received. The Court
in" the instant case avoids considering whether the trial court should receive
evidence of the influence of the misconduct upon the juror's mind in reaching
his verdict. Unless the method of evaluating the effect of the misconduct on the
verdict is objective, the court is probing into the juror's mental processes during
his deliberations. The patent injustice inflicted upon a losing defendant requires
a re-evaluation of the policy grounds underlying the adoption of Lord Mansfield's
rule to juror misconduct outside the jury room, instead of repeating the dogma
that a juror may not impeach his own verdict.
ARTHUR A. Russ, JR.
FUTURE INTERESTS-APPLICATION OF STATUTE To BAR ENFORCE-,
MENT OF MATURED REVERTER HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
On May 11, 1854, John Townsend and wife deeded land and a building
to the Trustees of Walton Academy. The deed, duly recorded, contained a re-
verter clause providing that the deed was to be valid only so long as the
premises were used for an Academy and for nothing else. On failure of this
condition the premises were to revert to Townsend and his heirs.' They were
used for educational purposes by Walton Academy until April 1, 1962, when
such use was discontinued. Plaintiff Board of Education succeeded to the
Academy's rights. Under section 345(3) of the New York Real Property Law
(the statute at issue) defendant was required to file a Declaration of Intention
to Preserve Restrictions on the Use of Land, by Sept. 1, 1961. This Declaration
was filed on April 13, 1962, seven months after the deadline. Plaintiff Board of
Education sued for title on stipulated facts, under the same statute (discussed
infra), which was designed to eliminate certain restrictions on the use of land,
and won a unanimous judgment in the Appellate Division.2 On. defendants'
appeal, held, reversed. The recording provisions of section 345 of the New York
Real Property Law are unconstitutional in that-they impair the obligatioil of con-
tracts and deprive defendants of property without due process of law, when
applied so as to bar enforcement of a reverter which matured after the-date the
statute set for filing notice of intent to preserve the reverter. Chief Judge
dict ... or concerning the mental processes by which it was reached." Comment, 47 Mich. L.
Rev. 261 (1948).
51. Rule 41 "Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict. . . no evidence shall be
received to show the effect of any statement, concIuct, event or condition upon the mind of a
juror as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict ... or concerning the mental
processes by which it was determined."
1. The clause read: "Provided nevertheless that the said lot and the building thereon
shall be used for the purposes of an Academy and no other then this deed shall remain in
full force and effect otherwise it shall become Void and the premises herein conveyed shall
revert to the said John Townsend party of the first part and to his heirs." Instant case at
364, 207 N.E.2d at 183, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 131 (1965).
2. Board of Educ. v. Miles, 18 A.D.2d 87, 238 N.Y.S.2d 766 (3d Dep't 1963).
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Desmond and Judge Fuld dissented, voting to affirm on the Appellate Division
opinion. Judge Bergan did not participate. Board of Educ. v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d
364, 207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965).
Section 345 of the New York Real Property Law was enacted in 1958
following Law Revision Commission reports recommending the elimination
of non-substantial restrictions on the use of land.3 Under section 345, which is
retroactive4 in application, an owner of a possibility of reverter or right of
entry for breach of condition subsequent must record a Declaration of Inten-
tion to Preserve Restrictions on the Use of Land0 not less than 27 nor more
than 30 years after the date of creation of the limitation. This Declaration must
be renewed every ten years. An additional recording provision, the basis of
litigation in the instant case, provides that conditions created prior to Sept. 1,
1931, must have been recorded by Sept. 1, 1961. Failure to duly record results
in extinguishment of the right.7 This section does not deal solely with old, use-
less limitations, but affects potentially valuable restrictions as well. 8
An estate in reversion (reverter) is the residue of an estate left in the
grantor, his heirs or devisees, after the termination of an estate granted by
3. N.Y. Law. Revision Commission Reports and Recommendations, N.Y. Leg. Doc.
No. 65(B), 211 (1958); No. 65(P), 689 (1951). See Comment, Constitutional Problems
Presented by the Retroactive Extinguishment of Forfeiture Restrictions on the Use of
Land: Sections 345-349 of the New York Real Property Law, 27 Albany L. Rev. 267
(1963); Sparks, Possibilities of Reverter and Right of Entry, 33 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1193 (1958).
4. "A retroactive statute is one which gives to preenactment conduct a different legal
effect from that which it would have had without the passage of the statute." Hochman,
The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
692 (1960).
5. A possibility of reverter is defined as "the undisposed of interest remaining in the
grantor, or in the heirs of the devisor when the owner of land in fee simple absolute has
conveyed or devised it in determinable fee, in fee simple conditional, or in determinable
fee simple conditional." 1 Simes, Future Interests § 177 (1936). The definitive feature of a
possibility of reverter is that the grantor retains the right to automatically regain the fee
upon the happening of an event. Fausett v. Guisewhite, 16 A.D.2d 82, 225 N.Y.S.2d 616
(3rd Dep't 1962).
6. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 345(3).
7. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 345(8) lists exceptions to the application of § 345. The
section does not apply when the condition or limitation is created in favor of (a) the
United States, New York State, or their governmental subdivisions; (b) the owner of a
reversion following an estate for life; (c) the owner of a reversion following an estate for
years where the number of years for which such estate was created will expire less then 70
years after the time recording of an initial declaration would otherwise be required under
§ 345; (d) the owner of a reversion on a lease of communication, transportation or trans-
mission lines; (e) a mortgagee or contractor-vendor of land or the holder of any other
security interest in land.
Section 345(9) (a) leaves the owner with injunctive or compensatory relief to the extent
the right is also imposed by a non-forfeiture restriction such as a covenant.
8. See Law Revision Commission Reports and Recommendations, N.Y. Leg. Doe.
No. 65(P), 712-13 (1951).
9. Sorrels v. McNally, 89 Fla. 457, 105 So. 106 (1925); Norman v. Horton, 344 Mo.
290, 126 S.WV.2d 187, 125 A.L.R. 531 (1939); Brown v. Guthery, 190 N.C. 822, 130 S.E.
836 (1925); King v. Scroggin, 92 N.C. 99, 53 Am. Rep. 410 (1885); Copenhaver v. Pendle-
ton, 155 Va. 463, 155 S.E. 802, 77 A.L.R. 324 (1930); Powers v. Trustees of Caledonia
County Grammar School, 93 Vt. 220, 106 Atl. 836 (1919). Cf. Helvering v. Wood, 309
U.S. 344 (1940).
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him.9 It arises only by operation of law,10 and is an actual estate in praesenti,
vested in the sense of a present fixed right of enjoyment.": A possibility of
reverter '1 however, is not a vested property right, but a mere future expecta-
tion, and thus may be defeated by statute,13 as it cannot be claimed to be
"property" taken without due process of law. A number of states have statutes
which provide for forfeiture of reverter or reentry rights on breach of condition
subsequent; such statutes are of three types. Under one type of statute, the
owner of a reversionary interest must file notice of intent to preserve it.' 4
Failure to do so extinguishes the right. Under the Statute of Limitations ap-
proach, after passage of a certain time, if the specified event actuating the
reverter does not occur, the limited estate is made absolute, regardless of the
terms of the creating instrument.' 5 Finally, under the third approach, notice
of intent to preserve the interest must be filed, and an action must be brought
to enforce it.'0 Failure to bring the action extinguishes the right.
Statutes intended to preserve the free alienability of land have their basis
in the police power of the state, and must thus be related to the public health,
safety, welfare, and possibly economic needs.' 7 Recording acts have their police
power basis in the prevention of fraud on subsequent purchasers.' 8 This basis
is sufficient to sustain the retrospective impairment of vested rights' 9 or the
alteration (again retrospectively) of private contractual obligations.20 Although
10. Carter v. Lewis, 364 Ill. 434, 4 N.E.2d 853, 108 A.L.R. 458 (1936); Akers v.
Clark, 184 Ill. 136, 56 N.E. 296, 75 Am. St. Rep. 152 (1900); Norman v. Horton, 344 Mo.
290, 126 S.W.2d 187, 125 A.L.R. 531 (1939); Copenhaver v. Pendleton, 155 Va. 463, 155
S.E. 802, 77 A.L.R. 324 (1930); Jordan v. City of Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312, 26 S.E. 266,
57 Am. St. Rep. 859, 36 L.R.A. 519 (1896).
11. Norman v. Horton, 344 Mo. 290, 126 S.W.2d 187, 125 A.L.R. 531 (1939).
12. See note 5, supra.
13. Bass v. Roanoke Nay. & Walter Power Co., 111 N.C. 439, 16 S.E. 402, 19 L.R.A.
247 (1892); Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 132 N.E. 280, 18 A.L.R. 992 (1921).
14. E.g., Iowa, § 614.17 I.C.A. (1943). See Tesdell v. Hanes, 248 Iowa 742, 82 N.W.2d
119 (1957).
15. Florida, F.S.A. 689.18 (1951). See Biltmore Village v. Royal Biltmore Village,
Inc., 71 So. 2d 727, 41 A.L.R.2d 1380 (Fla. 1954); Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan.
568, 203 P.2d 160 (1949). Contra, Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d
111 (1955). Other states have similar statutes. See, e.g., Illinois, S.HA. ch. 83. § 10a (1941).
16. Indiana, Burns Ind. Stat. Anno. §§ 2-628-638 (later repealed). With respect to
this type of statute see Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911); Turner v. New York, 168 U.S.
90 (1897).
17. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Weiler v. Dry
Dock Say. Inst., 258 App. Div. 581, 17 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd, 284 N.Y. 630,
29 N.E.2d 938 (1940); State v. Ross, 259 Wis. 379, 48 N.W.2d 460 (1951).
18. "Though the effect of such a law is to render the prior deed fraudulent and void
against a subsequent purchaser, it is not a law impairing the obligation of contracts; such
too is the power to pass acts of limitations, and their affect." Jackson ex dern. Hart v.
Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280, 289 (1830).
19. Curtis v. Whitney, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 68 (1871); Jackson ex dem. Hart v.
Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830); Matter of Pardee v. Rayfield, 192 App. Div. 5,
182 N.Y. Supp. 3 (4th Dep't 1920), aff'd, 230 N.Y. 543, 130 N.E. 886 (1920); Leonard v.
Harris, 147 App. Div. 458, 131 N.Y. Supp. 909 (3d Dep't 1911), aff'd, 211 N.Y. 511, 105
N.E. 1089 (1918). Contra, Varick's Executors v. Briggs, 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 543 (1839).
20. Twentieth Century Associates, Inc. v. Waldman, 294 N.Y. 571, 63 N.E.2d 177,
162 A.L.R. 197 (1945). See also the cases cited in note 19 supra.
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at one time the constitutional prohibition against this was considered absolute,21
the courts have, in the name of advancing the public welfare, adopted the
reasonableness standard used to test legislation under the due process clause.
22
Given a reasonable time for compliance with the statute, such legislation is
valid.
23
The Court reasoned that in order to sustain the recording provisions of the
statute (section 345(4) of the New York Real Property Law), a police power
basis had to exist either in the prevention of fraud on subsequent purchasers
or in clearing titles of contingent reversionary interests to preserve the free
alienability of land. Since there was no legislative purpose of protecting subse-
quent grantees, the statute could not be sustained on the same basis as record-
ing acts. The court then assumed, arguendo, the validity of a statute similar
to that upheld in Wickelinan v. Messner24 (which extinguished interests more
than forty years old, unless notice of them was recorded) and held the New
York recording provision unconstitutional as being impossible to comply with,
i.e., the reverter had not matured at the time the statute barred it, and no one
could ". . . have known prior to the cut-off date who would be parties in interest
at the time when the reverter took effect. ' 25 Thus, under these particular facts,
". . . it would be necessary for unascertained persons, perhaps not even in being,
to have recorded a declaration of intention to preserve a reverter which would
not take effect in enjoyment until an indefinite future time."120 The case was
then likened to Biltmore Village v. Royal, 2 7 which held a Florida statute, also
canceling certain reverters,28 unconstitutional on both due process and impair-
ment of contract obligations grounds.29 Finally, the court refused to sustain
the statute as a Statute of Limitations, as it ". . . purports to bar the remedy
21. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 212 (1827); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
22. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanagh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
23. Meigs v. Roberts, 162 N.Y. 371, 56 N.E. 838 (1900). See generally Bayse, Clear-
ing and Titles (1953).; Hammond, Limitations Upon Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of
Entry, in Current Trends in State Legislation 1953-54 (1955); Aigler, Constitutionality of
Marketable Title Acts, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 185 (1951) ; Aigler, A Supplement to "Constitutionality
of Marketable Title Acts"--1951-1957; Bayse, Trends and Progress-The Marketable Title
Acts, 47 Iowa L. Rev. 261 (1962); Nelson, Conveyancing in New York, 43 Cornell L.Q.
617 (1958).
24. 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800, 71 A.L.R.2d 816 (1957). The case was distinguished
on two grounds, first because the plaintiff did not have record title for the requisite statutory
period, and secondly because six years had elapsed between cesser of use for a school and
commencement of action to enforce the reverter.
25. Instant case at 373, 207 N.E.2d at 186, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (1965).
26. Ibid.
27. 71 So. 2d 727, 41 A.L.R.2d 1380 (Fla. 1954).
28. Fla. Stat. Ann. 689.18 (Cum. Supp. 1953). The statute cancelled all reverter pro-
visions in plats or deeds in effect for more than 21 years. The holder of the reversionary
interest had one year from the date of the act to institute suit to enforce the right; this
of course could apply only to matured reverters.
29. Although the court did not elaborate, presumably the due process ground was
similar to the instant case. The contract obligation ground was probably that it alters the
rights and duties of the parties under the deed.
RECENT CASES
before the right to enforce it has matured . . .,"30 the usual rule being that a
Statute of Limitation does not start to run against an owner of a possibility of
reverter or right of reentry until that owner has a right of action to recover
possession of the land.31
The Appellate Division upheld the statute even though it was retroactively
applied to a reverter that did not take effect until seven months after the date
for filing notice of intention to preserve pre-1931 reversionary interests had
expired. The lower court thought such application ". . . a reasonable and salu-
tory public control of the use of a peculiar form of property which, without
regulation, could adversely affect free alienability and development of land. It
is neither," said the court, "the impairment of contract nor a denial of due
process to require a man who owns so tenuous and troublesome an interest to
put it down in a public record."3 2 Whether one agrees or disagrees with this
rather cavalier treatment of what is in this particular case a valuable property
interest is largely a matter of policy choice,33 with the right of property owners
to devise as they wish opposed to the desire of society to maintain freely alien-
able realty. Even though "it is true that we in this country have apparently
become accustomed to viewing with relative equanimity the uncompensated
losses of valuable interests sustained by property owners who fail to comply
with the recording acts which are found in every one of our jurisdictions," 34 it
would seem there is an element of unfairness present when this philosophy is
applied in a situation where it is truly impossible to comply with the statute.
The crucial question in this case is whether such compliance is indeed im-
possible. The provision governing parties eligible to file notice of intent to pre-
serve these interests reads: "a person or persons having a right of entry in the
event of breach ... or having after breach ... a right of entry ... may record
a declaration .... ,.5 Following the rule that statutes are to be construed so as
to uphold their constitutionality,3 6 it would seem an easy matter to read this
provision so that any person owning the right could file at any time before
maturing of the reverter, as well as within the prescribed period after matura-
30. Instant case at 374, 207 N.E.2d at 187, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 137 (1965).
31. Monte v. Montalbano, 274 Ala. 29, 145 So. 2d 197 (1962); Luther v. Patman,
200 Ark. 853, 141 S.W.2d 42 (1940); Nearing v. City of Bridgeport, 137 Conn. 205, 75 A.2d
505 (1950); School Dist. v. Hanson, 186 Iowa 1314, 173 N.W. 873 (1919); Dewey v.
McLain, 7 Kan. 126, 12 Am. Rep. 4,18 (1871); McDonald v. Burke, 288 S.W.2d 363 (Ky.
1955).
32. Board of Educ. v. Miles, 18 A.D.2d 87, 93, 238 N.Y.S.2d 766, 772 (1963), rev'd, 15
N.Y.2d 364, 207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965).
33. It will be recalled that the statute was directed primarily at non-substantial limita-
tions on land, though it was conceded some valuable interests might also be eliminated.
With respect to these it seems fair to state the Law Revision Commission wished to give the
holders of such interests the minimum notice required by the Constitution. See note 8 supra,
and accompanying text. However, most of these interests have little or no economic value.
See Orgel, Valuation Under the Law of Eminent Domain (1936); Comment, 34 Mich. L.
Rev. 530, 537 (1936).
34. N.Y. Law Revision Commission Reports and Recommendations, N.Y. Leg. Doc.
No. 65(P) 689, 714 (1951).
35. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 345(2).
36. E.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
227
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tion. There is no real reason why the person who is eventually going to enforce
the right has to be the one filing the notice. This is particularly so in view of
section 59 of the N.Y. Real Property Law, which provides for the alienability
and devisability of reversionary interests. The Biltmore
3 7 case, relied on by the
Court of Appeals, involved a more drastic statute, as there, a suit had to be
brought to enforce the reverter within one year from the date of passage of the
act, and that year had expired before actuation of the reverter, making suit
impossible.38 The N.Y. Law Revision Commission anticipated the elimination
of a substantial number of useless, unenforced reverters and rights of reentry
when they stated: "With advantages of such magnitude in prospect, the in-
cidental sacrifices of the interests of many individuals might be tolerated with-
out too great difficulty."3 9 It is submitted that even assuming, arguendo, that
such legislative manhandling of property interests is desirable, retroactive ap-
plication is not consonant with traditional notions of due process when applied
to the particular facts of this case.40 However, if preservation of alienability is
of such importance that the legislature deems a statute of this type necessary,
it would seem more reasonable to hold that any owner of the reversionary
interest may file at any time up to the statutory cut-off date.
ALAN A. RANsom
INSURANCE LAW-MANDATORY ARBITRATION-INADEQUACY OF MVAIC
ARBITRATION AWARD NOT GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL REvIEmw
Decedent while operating his automobile struck a bridge abutment. He was
then struck from behind by a hit-and-run automobile and was fatally injured.
Decedent's estate and his insurance company failed to agree on an appropriate
amount for damages and in accordance with the terms of the policy, an arbitra-
tion was held. The 23-year old decedent was survived by his widow and two
infant children. Even though a conservative estimate would set the value of
decedent's life at $10,000,' the arbitrator awarded the estate $500.00. On motion
to vacate the arbitrator's award the Supreme Court, Special Term, set aside
37. Biltmore Village v. Royal Biltmore Village, Inc., 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla.), 41 A.L.R.2d
1380 (1954).
38. The statute does provided, however, that the restriction may be enforced by equit-
able remedies.
39. N.Y. Law Revision Commission Reports and Recommendations, N.Y. Leg. Doc.
No. 65(P), 689, 714 (1951).
40. See Simes & Taylor, Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation 288-89 (1960),
in which the authors set forth two Model Acts dealing with possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry. The first, which simply limits their duration, is not retroactive. The second,
limiting their duration when the required notice is not filed, is wholly retroactive. The
authors support its constitutionality on the reasonable recording requirement of the Wichel-
man case.
1. justice Bergan, dissenting in the instant case, valued the decedent's life at 60,000
dollars. The policy limits, however, would preclude an award in excess of 10,000 dollars. In-
stant case at 887, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 421.
